Finance Constraints and Inventory Investment: Empirical Tests with Panel Data by Rose Cunningham
Bank of Canada Banque du Canada
Working Paper 2004-38 / Document de travail 2004-38
Finance Constraints and Inventory
Investment: Empirical Tests with Panel Data
by
Rose CunninghamISSN 1192-5434
Printed in Canada on recycled paperBank of Canada Working Paper 2004-38
October 2004
Finance Constraints and Inventory





Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
rcunningham@bankofcanada.ca
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.iii
Contents
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract/Résumé. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Recent Empirical Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
3. Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Theoretical Model of Finance Constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Regression Equation and Estimation Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1 Negative cash flow observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 Finance constraints and asymmetric information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix: Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29iv
Acknowledgements
Many thanks for the advice and comments provided by Larry Schembri, Robert Lafrance, Denise
Côté, Ali Dib, Richard Dion, seminar participants, and editorial staff at the Bank of Canada. I also
thank Huntley Schaller, Stephen Ferris, Rose Anne Devlin, and Steve Ambler for their feedback
on this paper.v
Abstract
The author empirically tests two aspects of the interaction between ﬁnancial variables and
inventory investment: negative cash ﬂow and ﬁnance constraints due to asymmetric information.
This is one of the ﬁrst studies of inventory investment and ﬁnance constraints using Canadian
data. A sample of Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms over the period 1992Q2–1999Q4 is split into
subsamples based on age, bond rating, and size to reﬂect expected differences in degrees of
asymmetric information problems. The ﬁndings are consistent with a model in which inventory
investment is a U-shaped function of cash ﬂow. Higher degrees of information asymmetry do not
appear to generate differences in the sensitivity of inventory investment to cash ﬂow during the
sample period.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22, G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles; Financial institutions
Résumé
L’auteure teste empiriquement deux aspects de l’interaction entre les investissements en stocks et
les variables ﬁnancières, à savoir le comportement de ceux-ci en présence, d’une part, de ﬂux de
trésorerie négatifs et, d’autre part, de contraintes de ﬁnancement dues à une asymétrie
d’information entre emprunteur et prêteur. Il s’agit de l’une des premières études menées sur le
sujet à partir de données canadiennes. L’échantillon d’entreprises manufacturières qu’utilise
l’auteure couvre la période allant du deuxième trimestre de 1992 au quatrième trimestre de 1999
et est subdivisé en fonction de l’âge, de la cote de crédit et de la taille des entreprises aﬁn de tenir
compte des différences attendues dans le degré d’asymétrie d’information. Les résultats obtenus
cadrent avec un modèle où la relation entre les investissements en stocks et les ﬂux de trésorerie
décrit une courbe en U. Le degré d’asymétrie ne semble pas inﬂuencer la sensibilité des
investissements en stocks aux ﬂux de trésorerie durant la période d’estimation.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E22, G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques; Institutions ﬁnancières 1 
1.  Introduction 
Models of finance constraints attempt to explain how information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders can cause some profitable investment projects to remain unexploited. 
Information asymmetries in capital markets arise when firms have private information that 
cannot be costlessly observed by outside lenders. In their seminal work on finance constraints, 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) show that such firms may have to pay a premium for 
external financing that is not fully collateralized by their internal funds. In models of finance 
constraints, the higher cost of external finance causes firms that have high degrees of information 
asymmetry to finance more of their investment activities with internal funds. Firms that have low 
degrees of information asymmetry and therefore low information costs do not face such 
premiums on external funds, and therefore their investment activities are less constrained by their 
internal funds.  
 
Finance constraints are believed to bind most strongly when interest rates rise and during 
recessions,  when  internal funds  decline and collateral values weaken. This means  external 
finance becomes more expensive for firms that have high information costs. These more finance-
constrained firms reduce investment spending and production, amplifying the business cycle 
downturn. Similarly, positive shocks can cause constrained firms to have greater access to 
external  credit, which increases their investment and production  and further strengthens an 
expansion.
1 Thus, understanding the extent to which finance constraints affect firms may  shed 
light on business cycle fluctuations.  
 
This paper looks for evidence of finance constraints by examining inventory investment 
behaviour. Inventory  investment is of interest  because  inventories  have low adjustment costs 
compared with capital investment activities. Thus, one would expect that inventory investment 
would be used by finance-constrained firms to respond to negative shocks. For example, if cash 
                                                  
1.  For a description of  financial accelerator effects, s ee Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 
(1993), and Kiyotaki, and Moore (1997). Older macroeconomics literature in this area includes 
Fisher (1933) Gurley, and Shaw (1955, 1960). 
  2 
flow declines, the amount of external borrowing collateralized by internal funds also declines, 
and the firm must reduce its borrowing or pay a premium on loans in excess of cash flow. Rather 
than suspend a capital project,  the firm  may  choose to hold fewer inventories. Empirically, 
Blinder, and Maccini (1991)  show that inventory investment is one of the most volatile, 
procyclical components of output over the business cycle in the United States. Table 1 indicates 
that this is also true for Canada: inventory investment declines by almost 200 per cent more than 
the decline in output over an average business cycle. Finance constraints can amplify business 
cycle shocks and therefore they may help explain some of the observed volatility in inventory 
investment.2  
 
Much of the existing empirical research on finance constraints has been criticized on at least two 
fronts. First, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) argue that many tests for finance constraints do 
not have  proper theoretical foundations because they compare more finance-constrained  with 
less finance-constrained firms, whereas the theory’s predictions deal with finance-constrained 
and unconstrained firms. Second, many of the existing studies of finance constraints ignore the 
role played by firms that have negative cash flows, even though they are empirically important and 
account for 8 to 22 per cent of the observations in studies that keep them in the sample.
3   
 
This paper tests a model by Povel and  Raith (2002) that addresses both these concerns. Their 
model derives  optimal investment behaviour in the presence of negative internal funds and 
varying degrees of asymmetric information. Thus,  it provides a more  solid  theoretical 
underpinning for conventional empirical tests for finance constraints. I test the predictions of 
Povel and Raith’s model  on Canadian firm-level data on inventory investment for the period 
1992Q2–1999Q4. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study of finance constraints and 
inventory investment using Canadian data.  My findings  indicate that negative c ash flow 
observations have a significant effect on the sensitivity of inventory investment to cash flow, 
consistent with the U-shaped relationship predicted by the model. In the sample period, however, 
there is little evidence of finance constraints due to asymmetric information, since  the 
                                                  
2.  The finance-constraints hypothesis attempts to explain changes in inventory investment, in addition 
to the usual buffer stock role that inventories play.  
3.  These include Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2003), Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001), and this study.  3 
coefficients on cash flow are not statistically different across firm groups believed to have 
different degrees of asymmetric information.  
2.  Recent Empirical Literature 
Much of the empirical work on finance constraints faced by firms focuses on capital stock 
investment. Hubbard (1998)  conducts a survey of  the  empirical literature on capital market 
imperfections and investment. These studies generally test the standard model of Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) by comparing the sensitivities of investment to cash flow across 
groups of firms. These firms are categorized a priori as finance-constrained or unconstrained, 
based on characteristics that proxy for information asymmetry. Characteristics commonly used to 
categorize firms include bond ratings, dividends, age, size, and membership in industrial groups. 
Evidence obtained by the majority of studies supports the theory that finance constraints reduce 
investment by firms that have high information costs.
4  
 
Nevertheless, an important debate on  investment–cash flow sensitivities has arisen in the 
literature. Several recent studies do not find the predicted differences in cash flow sensitivities 
based on asymmetric information; in some cases, unconstrained firms’ investment is  more 
sensitive to cash flow than that of financially constrained firms (Allayannis and Mozumdar 2001; 
Cleary 1999; Kaplan and Zingales 1997; and Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995). Allayannis and 
Mozumdar specifically examine the influence of negative cash flows in tests for investment–cash 
flow sensitivities. They find that negative cash flow observations can generate findings that 
contradict the standard theory. However, once they remove negative cash flow observations, the 
investment–cash flow sensitivities do not differ between the finance-constraint categories.  
 
Povel and Raith (2002) develop a theoretical model of finance constraints that helps to explain 
some of these contradictory findings. Their model is explained in section 4. Cleary, Povel, and 
Raith (2003) test Povel and Raith’s model using capital investment data and find evidence of a 
U-shaped relationship between investment and cash flow. They also find that investment is more 
sensitive to cash flow for firms that are expected to face greater finance constraints, consistent 
                                                  
4.  Examples of these studies include Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) and Whited (1992), who 
use data from the United States; Schaller (1993), who tests Canadian data; and Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1991), who test finance-constraint models on Japanese panel data.   4 
with the standard models.  I test some of the implications of Povel and Raith’s model  on 
inventory investment data using methods similar to those of Allayannis and Mozumdar.  
 
In the literature on  inventory investment, the  results more clearly support the theory of the 
finance constraints. Carpenter, Fazzari, and Peterson (1994, 1998), Guariglia (1999), Zakrajsek 
(1997), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), and Kashyap, Stein, 
and Wilcox (1993) examine data on inventory investment for evidence of finance constraints. 
They all test some form of partial-adjustment  inventory  model  augmented with financial 
variables that proxy for internal funds, such as cash flow, interest coverage ratio, liquidity ratios, 
or other financial ratios. These studies typically feature firm-level data analyzed over periods of 
recession or periods when monetary policy was known to be restrictive.
5 The augmented model 
of  inventory investment is estimated separately for the finance-constrained and unconstrained 
groups of firms. Most authors focus on manufacturing firms; the exceptions are Kashyap, Stein, 
and Wilcox (1993), who use aggregate data, and Zakrajsek (1997), who studies retail sector 
inventories. Six of the seven papers analyze data from the United States; Guariglia tests for 
finance constraints using data from the United Kingdom. Mine  is one of the first  inventory 
studies to explicitly consider the effect of negative cash flow observations.  
 
Previous studies on inventory investment and finance constraints find that the financial variables 
have significant and larger coefficients for firms in the finance-constrained group compared with 
the unconstrained firms. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) also find that financial variables are 
significant in explaining inventory investment using aggregate data. Although the evidence in the 
literature on  fixed investment and finance constraints is mixed, research  to  date on inventory 
investment is less ambiguous. Existing studies more clearly support the view that finance 
constraints lead to a positive relationship between cash flow and inventory investment.  
                                                  
5.  Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) do not use firm-level data; 
instead, they use industry-level data or aggregate data.  5 
3.  Data Description 
This study uses Compustat data on quarterly financial statement items from publicly traded 
Canadian manufacturing firms.
6 There are a total of 2,211 observations on 166 firms for the 
period 1992Q2–1999Q4. Firms with fewer than 6 consecutive quarters of data are not included, 
since lags of variables are used as instruments in the regression specification. The number of 
observations on each firm varies from 6 quarters to 30 quarters, so the panel is unbalanced. The 
average firm in the dataset has 13 quarters of data. I also omit observations where there is zero 
inventory investment for 3 or more consecutive quarters, since zero inventory investment may 
indicate a temporary shutdown or disruption in the firm’s activities. Observations are also 
excluded for periods of merger activity, as identified by Compustat, since mergers may disrupt 
inventories or generate other a nomalies. The variables of interest for regression testing are: 
inventories, cash flow, sales, and total assets. These variables are explained in more detail in the 
appendix. To ensure that the regression results are not driven by a few outlying observations, the 
upper and lower 1 per cent values of observations for inventory stock, sales, and cash flow are 
removed. 
 
As in the other studies on finance constraints using panel data, firms are categorized as likely to 
be  more or less finance-constrained based  on proxies for a high or low degree of information 
asymmetry between the firm and outside lenders. Three different criteria proxy for information 
asymmetries: age, the presence of a bond rating, and size.  
 
Based on its date of incorporation, a firm is classified as young if its age is less than that of the 
median firm in the sample at time t.
7 An old firm has an age equal to or greater than the median 
                                                  
6.  The data are from Compustat’s Research Insight North American database of firms actively traded 
on Canadian stock exchanges as of June 2000. This dataset includes companies that were publicly 
traded over the whole period and those that began trading at some point during the period. 
However, any firms that stopped trading during the period are not included. Firms are considered to 
be in the manufacturing sector if their primary (U.S.)  Standard industrial classification (SIC) 
assigned by Compustat lies in the range 2000–3999. 
7.  I use the Financial Post/Mergent FIS Online database for data on the year of incorporation. Where 
the FIS database  does not provide the year of incorporation, I use company  Web sites and the 
SEDAR Web site from the Canadian Securities Administrators. SEDAR is an Internet database of 
Canadian publicly traded firms’ financial statements, similar to the EDGAR database in the United 
States.  6 
age of firms in the sample at time t. Depending on the composition of the sample at a given time, 
a firm may be classified as young in one period and old in another. Firms that are classified as 
young are expected to have more costly asymmetric information problems with borrowers, and a 
priori are assumed to be more finance-constrained.  
 
Small firms are defined as those that have total assets of less than the median value of total assets 
in period t, and they are expected to be more finance-constrained. Firms that have total asset 
values greater than or equal to the median value are considered large, and  expected to be less 
constrained. As in the split by age, firms may change size categories depending on the size of 
other firms in the sample in a given period. Splitting the sample at the median for size or age is 
an intuitive method and is consistent with several earlier studies. Nevertheless, the median may 
not necessarily be consistent with the true boundary  between firms that are more  finance-
constrained and those that have little difficulty obtaining external finance. 
 
Bond ratings provide a better, exogenous proxy for splitting the sample to reflect differences in 
information available to external lenders. Firms that have their corporate bonds rated by a bond 
rating agency are considered likely to face fewer finance constraints than unrated firms, since 
more information is  available to lenders about the quality of the rated firms’ investment 
opportunities. Firms are classified as bond-rated if they have a rating at the end of the sample 
period, based on the ratings available from the Dominion Bond Rating Service Web site (as of 
June 2001) and the ratings of Standard and Poor’s provided in the Financial Post Corporate 
Bond Record 1999. Firms do not switch categories with respect to bond rating over the period. 
Using this method, 41 of the 166 firms in the sample are rated, and 125 are unrated.  
 
Table 2  reports summary statistics for the full sample and subsamples by age, the presence of a 
bond rating, and size. One of the most important features of the data is the prevalence of negative 
cash flow observations; 93 of the 166 firms have at least 1 quarter with negative cash flow, and 
32 firms have 4 or more quarters with negative cash flow. Three industries—telecoms, computer 
equipment, and biotech—account for 206 of the 342 firm-quarter observations where cash flow 
is negative.
8 These three industries make up 60 per cent of the negative cash flow observations. 
Overall, observations with negative cash flow account for 15.5 per cent of the full sample of 
                                                  
8.  Identified by Compustat primary 2-digit SICs of 35, 36, and 38.  7 
2,211 firm-quarter observations.  This share appears consistent with the other studies that 
examine  negative cash flows. Allayannis and Mozumdar find  that 8  per  cent of firm-year 
observations include negative cash flows in a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms over the 
period 1977–96. Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2003) use annual Compustat data on non-financial 
firms for 1980–99, in which 22 per cent of the observations have negative cash flows.  
 
The absolute levels of all the variables differ significantly between the groups of firms, 
regardless of whether age, bond ratings, or size characteristics are used to split the sample. The 
firms in the groups expected to be more finance-constrained (young, unrated, or small) have 
much lower levels of total assets, inventory stock, sales, and cash flow. Scaling the variables by 
total assets, however, reduces the differences across finance-constraint categories considerably.  
 
The mean of cash flow to total assets (CF/TA), shown near the bottom of Table 2 , is much 
smaller for the firms in the more finance-constrained categories relative to the other firms. The 
mean of CF/TA is 0.005 for young firms, which is one-quarter of the mean value of CF/TA for 
old firms, 0.020. This ratio is 0.01 for unrated firms, or about half the mean CF/TA of rated 
firms, 0.019.  For the average small firm,  the ratio of negative cash flow to assets is,  -0.001, 
compared with the much higher ratio of 0.022 for the average large firm. However, the standard 
deviations are also considerably larger for the  more finance-constrained firms, and there are 
often fewer observations per firm for young, unrated, or small firms. 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the ratio of inventory investment to total assets 
(?N/TA). This ratio is similar across young and old firms, but unrated firms and small firms have 
larger ratios than their counterparts for this variable. It is interesting that two types of firms 
expected to be more finance-constrained, the unrated and the small firms, tend to have larger 
ratios of inventory investment despite lower ratios of average cash flow. The ratio of sales to 
inventory stock (S/N) is used to reflect the firm’s long-run target inventory. The mean of the 
sales-to-inventory ratios does not differ substantially across finance-constraint categories, which 
suggests that there are similar inventory targets for different categories of firms.  
  8 
4.  Theoretical Model of Finance Constraints 
Povel and  Raith’s (2002) model  of  the optimal level of investment under finance constraints 
provides a theoretical basis for many existing empirical tests of finance constraints, and explains 
some of the recent contradictory findings on fixed investment and finance constraints. Two 
features of their model also make it well-suited to potentially explain the inventory investment 
behaviour of firms in my sample. First, it assumes that the firm may determine the scale of its 
investment rather than make a  binary choice on whether to undertake an  investment project. 
Scalable investment seems to be a more appropriate description of inventory investment than an 
all-or-none investment.  Second, internal funds (often operationalized as cash flow) may be 
negative. This is useful in the context of my data, which have a large number of observations 
with negative cash flow.  
 
It should be possible to analyze inventory investment using Povel and Raith’s model, since it 
applies to any debt-financed investment. A firm may finance inventory investment out of debt 
rather than internal funds if it plans to significantly increase inventory levels or the desired ratio 
of inventory to sales. This may occur in response to sales expanding rapidly or just becoming 
harder to predict; for example, if the firm is expanding into new markets or selling new product 
lines, or if increased competition increases its incentive to avoid stockouts by m aintaining a 
larger inventory buffer.  
 
In Povel and Raith’s model, a firm earns revenues  that are not observable to the  external 
investor, creating a potential moral hazard problem due to asymmetric information. Thus, 
internal and external funds will not  be equivalent in cost to the firm.  The authors use the 
investor’s break-even constraint to derive the costs of external funds. Their main  finding is that 
the firm’s optimal investment function is U-shaped over the range of feasible levels of internal 
funds (cash flow, CF). The solid line in Figure 1 shows this relationship for a firm that has no 
information asymmetry problems. The first-best level of investment, I*, is undertaken if the firm 
can fund the investment internally with its own cash flow; i.e., when CF equals I*. With cash 
flow positive and less than  I*, the optimal investment is also less than  I*, but positive and 
increasing in cash flow. This is consistent with earlier models based on Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Peterson (1988) that imply a positive,  monotonic relationship between investment and internal  9 
funds. In the range where internal funds are negative, however, investment may rise or fall as 
cash flow increases. In the most extreme case, the firm’s cash flow is at the lower bound, where 
it is still possible to obtain financing, CF. In this case, optimal investment would be as high as 
the first-best level, I*.  
 
The U -shaped investment–cash flow relationship  is the result of two opposing effects: a cost 
effect and a revenue effect. In the case of the cost effect, higher levels of investment increase the 
firm’s repayment costs and thereby raise its risk of default and liquidation, in turn raising the 
marginal cost of  debt finance. In the case of the revenue effect, higher levels of investment 
generate more revenue, which increases the firm’s chance of survival and lowers the marginal 
cost of debt finance.
 9  
 
Povel and Raith prove that the cost effect dominates when the firm has positive or slightly 
negative cash flow, and that the revenue effect dominates when the firm has significantly 
negative cash flow. The dominance of the cost effect implies the familiar, positive monotonic 
investment–cash flow relationship such that an increase in cash flow leads to an increase in 
investment: as internal funds ( cash flow) increase, the probability of default declines and the 
marginal cost of borrowing falls.  
 
If the firm has a substantially negative cash flow, the revenue effect dominates. Negative cash 
flow means that part of the firm’s borrowing must be used to offset its negative cash flow (e.g., 
to pay down existing debt, or to cover fixed costs), and, as cash flow becomes more negative, a 
larger share of any loan must be used to cover these non-revenue-generating expenses. For the 
investor to break even, the firm m ust be able to generate revenue. Therefore, the firm must 
increase the scale of its project, even as CF falls, to generate enough revenue to repay the loan; 
the revenue effect dominates and there is a negative relationship between cash flow and 
investment. With respect to inventory investment, this would mean that the firm increases its 
production and inventory levels more as cash flow falls, to generate enough sales to repay the 
loan. This seems plausible for firms in the industries that make up most of our negative 
observations ( telecom, computer equipment,  and biotech), because these industries were 
                                                  
9.   In the region where the investment function reaches a minimum, it is relatively insensitive to 
changes in cash flow, because the revenue and cost effects essentially cancel each other out.  10 
expanding rapidly  during the sample period. Cash flow could be quite negative even as the 
prospects for increased sales were very good, and the financing of larger inventory investments 
for such firms would be consistent with a large revenue effect in this model. 
 
Povel and Raith also demonstrate that a U -shaped investment function occurs when there is 
asymmetric information between the firm and the outside investor. The dashed line in Figure 1 
shows the effects of information asymmetry on the investment function. As the degree of 
information asymmetry increases, the investment function becomes steeper almost everywhere, 
except in the region of the minimum. Asymmetric information leads to increased sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. 
 
This model yields at least two testable implications. In the presence of both positive and negative 
cash flow observations, the model predicts that the investment–cash flow function will be non-
monotonic; specifically, it will be U-shaped. One can test for non-monotonicity by removing the 
negative cash flow observations. This should result in a positive monotonic relationship between 
cash flow and inventory investment for all firms. One can also test whether there is a negative 
relationship in the region where cash flows are negative. A third set of empirical tests can assess 
the influence of asymmetric information on inventory investment. Firms believed to have a 
higher degree of asymmetric information are predicted to have larger slope coefficients on the 
cash flow variable than firms that have fewer asymmetric information problems. 
5.  Regression Equation and Estimation Results  
I use a regression equation based on  partial adjustment  inventory  models  by Lovell (1961).  
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) point out that these  types of  models are most appropriate  for 
aggregated  inventory  data (which is the case here)  that are not  broken down  into work-in-
progress, raw materials, or finished goods.  Partial-adjustment inventory models describe a 
process of inventory investment whereby each firm has a desired or “target” level of inventories. 
Augmenting the model with variables to reflect the firm’s financial situation is a common 
technique used to test for finance constraints.  I assume that  the  desired inventory level,  N*, 
depends on expected sales relative to existing inventories, the real interest rate, and cash flow.  
 
  11 
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The variables Nit, Sit, and CFit denote firm i’s real inventory, sales, and cash flow, respectively, 
for period t.
10 The dependent variable is inventory investment, Nit - Nit-1. The real interest rate, r, 
is defined as the prime rate less the inflation rate based on the GDP deflator. The effects of the 
firm’s desired  inventory stock are captured by the first three regressors (in levels): the ratio of 
expected sales to lagged inventory levels,  the  lag of the real interest rate, and the lag of cash 
flow. Along with the level terms, lagged differences of inventories, sales, the interest rate, and 
cash flow are included to capture the effects of short-run dynamics. The last three terms in the 
equation make up the firm-specific (?i.), time-specific (?t,), and idiosyncratic (eit) components of 
the error term. A full set of time-dummy variables is used to capture the time-specific effects.
11  
 
This specification includes both  long-run and  short-run effects, so  it  has an error-correction 
format in which the ratio of expected sales to lagged inventories is the error-correction term. 
Thus, ß1 should have a positive coefficient, since increases in the ratio (due to either increased 
expected sales or low levels of previous inventories) should raise  N
* and  therefore increase 
current inventory investment. Real interest rates affect the holding cost of inventories, so I expect 
ß2 to be negative. The sign of ß3 depends on whether the model includes negative cash flows, due 
to the predicted U-shaped relationship, as discussed below. The theoretical model is static and 
can be interpreted as explaining steady-state behaviour. Therefore,  I expect the influence of 
finance constraints to be reflected primarily in the  long-run behaviour of inventories, with the 
                                                  
10.   Since the data include some observations with negative cash flow, I cannot transform the data using 
logs. To control for possible heteroscedasticity, inventory investment, cash flow, and sales levels 
are divided by total assets first, in addition to differencing or other transformations. The “expected 
sales” category  is already scaled by inventory in the previous period, so it is not scaled by total 
assets.  
11.   The regression model is based on those of Guariglia (1999), Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994) and 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993).  12 
coefficient on CFit-1 being the main focus of the analysis. The variables that capture short-run 
dynamics do not have clear sign predictions.   
 
Since lagged dependent variables are included as regressors and there are a relatively small 
number of time periods for each firm, both fixed effects and  generalized least squares (GLS) 
random-effects estimators will be inconsistent. Their inconsistency arises from the correlation of 
the lagged dependent variable with the fixed-effect component of the error term.
12 First-
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Equation (2) is estimated using the Arellano-Bond  (1991) generalized method of moments 
estimator. In the desired sales term, expected sales,  Et-1Sit /Nit-1, is  proxied by  Sit-1/Nit-1. The 
consistency of the Arellano-Bond estimator requires that there is no second-order autocorrelation 
in the residual, so the results of an m2 test are reported in the results below. Also reported are the 
results of a Sargan test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions used by the Arellano-
Bond estimator.
13  
5.1   Negative cash flow observations  
Table 3   reports the results of  testing for a U -shaped relationship between  cash flow  and 
inventory investment by estimating the model using: all observations (first column), observations 
with  only  non-negative cash flows (second column), and  observations with only  negative cash 
                                                  
12.   See Baltagi (1995,125–26). 
13.   Since the Sargan test tends to overreject the null hypothesis of valid instruments in the one-step 
Arellano-Bond estimator, the two-step estimator results are reported for the m2 and Sargan tests. 
The coefficient estimates and standard errors reported, however, are from the one-step estimation 
procedure, since Arellano and Bond recommend using one-step results for inference. I assume that 
all variables except the lagged dependent variable are exogenous. It may be more accurate to treat 
sales and cash flows as predetermined, a weaker assumption than exogeneity, but this would require 
more observations per firm than are available. Stata software is used to perform the regressions.  13 
flows ( third  column).  The  p-values for the Sargan tests do not reject the hypothesis that the 
moment restrictions used in the model are valid, which suggests that the model is correctly 
specified. Similarly, the m2 test statistics in all three columns imply that one cannot reject the 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals, so the estimates are consistent. 
Note that, although there are many observations in the sample where cash flows are negative, 
several lags are required to estimate the model. T herefore, relatively fewer firms and 
observations are available for the regression in column three.  
 
The theoretical model does not clearly imply the nature of the short-run movements in inventory 
investment in response to changes in cash flow, so the primary variable of interest is the first 
regressor in each table, ?CF, which is intended to capture the steady-state nature of the inventory 
investment–cash flow relationship. The first column of Table 3 contains only two variables that 
are significantly different from zero: the s ales-to-inventory ratio, and lags of the dependent 
variable. When all  observations are included in the regression, the cash flow variables are not 
significantly different from zero. This is consistent with changes in slope if there is a U-shaped 
relationship between inventory investment and cash flow, because the sign may change as cash 
flow becomes negative. In the second column, when the negative cash flow observations are 
removed, the  long-run cash flow term has much a larger, positive coefficient, 0.38, which is 
significant at the  1 per cent level. In the third column, the regression using only observations 
with negative cash flows, the coefficient on ?CF is negative, as expected, but the standard errors 
in this regression are large and the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. These 
results provide some moderate, albeit partial,  support for the U-shaped function predicted by 
Povel and Raith’s model.  
 
Tables 4 through  6 show the regression results for estimating equation (2) when the sample of 
firms is split by age, bond rating, or size, respectively. In this set of tables, the first two columns 
of each table contain the regression results with all cash flow observations included. The third 
and fourth columns show the regression results when negative cash flow observations are 
removed. (Regressions  using only negative cash flow observations are not possible for each 
subgroup, because of the small number of observations.) In each group of firms, the coefficient 
on  ?CF increases when the negative cash flow observations are removed. For young, unrated, 
small, and large firms, ?CF is not significant when all observations are considered, but removing  14 
negative cash flows leads ?CF to become significant. Old firms’ long-term cash flow coefficient 
is significant at the 10 per cent  level i n the initial regression, but the coefficient more than 
doubles to 0.585, which is significant at the 1  per cent level in the regression without negative 
cash flows. Only the estimates for rated firms show little change in the ?CF coefficient, 0.267 to 
0.273, and the coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level in both regressions. 
 
The regression results with and without negative cash flow observations suggest that, when firms 
are not undergoing financial distress, inventory investment i ncreases as cash flow increases. 
These findings support the first prediction of Povel and Raith’s model and are consistent with the 
results of similar tests by Allayannis and Mozumdar using data on fixed investment.
14  
5.2   Finance constraints and asymmetric information 
The primary concern in the finance-constraints literature is the effect of asymmetric information 
in capital markets on investment behaviour. Tables 4 through 6 show the estimation results when 
firms are grouped a priori to reflect information asymmetries. Ignoring the negative cash flow 
observations, Povel and Raith’s model and earlier models of asymmetric information in capital 
markets imply that the young, unrated, and small firms would have positive and significant 
coefficients on the cash flow term, and that the cash flow coefficients for these firms would be 
larger than the cash flow coefficients estimated for the old, rated, and large firms. Table  4 
compares young and old firms. The point estimates on the long-run cash flow coefficient are 
actually larger for the old firms (0.585) than for the young firms (0.278). However, the 
difference in the point estimates for the  ?CF coefficient for young and old firms is not 
statistically significant. Similarly, in the regressions  that have only non-negative cash flow 
observations, the estimated cash flow coefficients are nearly identical for unrated and rated  
                                                  
14.   The long-run relationship between inventory investment and cash flow is the primary concern. In 
several regressions, however, the second differences of the cash flow term, which are intended to 
show the influence of short-run dynamics, have negative and significant coefficients. This is 
somewhat puzzling, but similar conflicting signs between long-run and short-run cash flow 
variables are also found in Zakrajsek (1997).  15 
firms, 0.283 and 0.273, respectively.15 These estimates suggest there is no evidence of finance 
constraints due to asymmetric information when I split the sample by age or bond rating. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar obtain similar results. Testing the sensitivity of inventory investment 
to coverage ratio, Guariglia (1999) finds that the U.K. data on total inventories do not show 
significant differences between finance-constraint groups when the sample is split based on 
financial ratios (coverage, and net leverage ratio). She does, however, find evidence supporting 
the predictions of finance-constraint models when she uses cash flow rather than the coverage 
ratio as a proxy for the financial health of the firm.  
 
Table 6 reports the estimates of inventory investment–cash flow sensitivities when the sample is 
split by size.  These findings also contradict the theoretical models, since  the inventory 
investment by large firms appears to depend more on cash flow than does that by small firms. 
The coefficient on ?CF for small firms is 0.365, which is significantly less than the estimate of 
0.464 for large firms. These findings are similar to those of Cleary (1999), who finds that the 
least finance-constrained firms have the largest fixed investment–cash flow sensitivities.  
 
Overall,  my results do not support the view that information asymmetries generate greater 
sensitivity between inventory investment and cash flow.16 Moreover, it appears that the ongoing 
debate about cash flow sensitivities in the fixed-investment literature also extends to inventory 
investment.  
 
My findings differ from most previous research on inventory investment and finance constraints, 
but the period under study also differs. Most previous inventory papers focus  explicitly on 
recessions or low-growth periods. One possible reason for my  not finding evidence of finance 
constraints due to information asymmetries is the sample period. The latter years of the 1990s 
                                                  
15.  To test whether the coefficients on ?CF are statistically different between young and old firms, I 
estimate the model for the full sample including a dummy variable, YOUNG, and interacting all the 
regressors with the dummy variable. I then test whether the dummy variable and the interaction 
variable , ?CF*YOUNG, are jointly equal to zero. The p-val ue for this F-test is 0.42, indicating no 
statistical difference. The same method and tests for bond ratings generate an F-test with p-value of 
0.159, indicating statistical difference only at the 15.9 per cent level. The test for small versus large 
firms has a p-value of 0.00, which implies that the cash flow coefficients are significantly different 
for these groups of firms. 
16.   Similar regressions using OLS and fixed-effects (not shown) estimates generate the same 
conclusions.  16 
were a period of strong business cycle expansion, a time when finance constraints may not bind. 
Moreover, during this period there may have been a speculative bubble in financial markets, 
which could have meant unusually generous access to capital for firms that one expects to be 
finance-constrained, such as young start-up firms. Allayannis and Mozumdar demonstrate that 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow declined over the period 1977–96. They suggest that 
improvements in information available to capital markets or an increase in the supply of funds to 
primary capital markets may have improved the access to external funds for smaller and younger 
firms. In the inventory literature, Carpenter, Fazzari, and Peterson (1994) also observe smaller 
coefficients on cash flow variables in the period 1988–92 compared with 1981–83 and 1984–88. 
They attribute the reduction in  the sensitivity of inventory investment to changes in business 
practice, such as the introduction of just-in-time inventory management. 
6.   Conclusions 
This paper has contributed to the research that examines the effect of financial variables on 
investment, including inventory investment. I  have  estimated an error-correction model for 
inventory investment augmented with cash flows. An important factor that has only recently 
begun to be studied is the effect of negative cash flow observations. Povel and Raith demonstrate 
that the relationship between investment and cash flow in the presence of negative cash flow is 
non-monotonic and U-shaped, contrary to earlier linear models. The regression model was first 
estimated with all cash flow observations and then with negative cash flows removed.  My 
findings imply that Povel and Raith’s model may also apply to inventory investment, because 
cash flow coefficients are positive and significant only when negative cash flow observations are 
omitted. Estimating the model only with  observations where cash flow was negative yielded a 
negative but not significant relationship between inventory investment and cash flow. 
 
A second set of regressions were conducted to test for finance constraints due to information 
asymmetries between  firms a nd  external  lenders. These regressions estimated the model 
separately for old versus young firms, bond-rated versus unrated firms, and large versus small 
firms. In each pair of regressions, the latter group of firms was expected to be more finance-
constrained.  My findings, however, did not conform to the predictions of the theory. Once the 
negative cash flow observations were removed, there was no statistically significant difference  17 
between estimated cash flow coefficients for young and old firms, nor for rated and unrated 
firms. The cash flow coefficient estimates were significantly different between large firms and 
small firms, but the findings were the reverse of the theoretical prediction. The estimated cash 
flow coefficients were larger for large firms than for small firms, implying that the less finance-
constrained firms rely more on internal funds to finance inventory investment than the firms with 
poor access to external finance. Therefore,  it does not appear that  information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders generated a stronger link between cash flow and inventory 
investment for Canadian manufacturing firms over the sample  period, 1992Q2–1999Q4. 
Previous work on inventory investment has mostly supported theories of asymmetric information 
and finance constraints, but my findings show that some of the puzzles noted in the literature on 
fixed-investment finance constraints also arise with inventory investment.  
 
Further research could build on these findings by using data for a longer time period. The effects 
of finance constraints may be relatively hard to detect in  my sample period  of, 1992–99, since 
the Canadian economy did not experience a recession during those years and finance constraints 
are likely to bind most strongly in recession periods. Other sectors of the economy may have 
more volatile inventory investment than the manufacturing sector, so additional inventory studies 
that examine other sectors would also be helpful.   18 
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Table 1: Inventory Investment in Canadian Recessions, Millions of 1992 Canadian dollars 







Change in inventory 
investment as a % of 
change in real GDP 
1947Q2–1948Q1  -1,847  -4,577  248% 
1951Q1–1951Q3  -3,484  -937  27% 
1956Q4–1958Q1  -1,963  -10,805  550% 
1969Q4–1970Q2  -2,458  -3,083  125% 
1980Q1–1980Q3  -3,497  -12,401  355% 
1981Q2–1982Q4  -32,360  -26,194  81% 
1990Q1–1991Q1  -21,608  -588  3% 
Average  -9,606  -6,598  198% 
Notes: All figures are converted to 1992 Canadian dollars using the GDP deflator. Recession dates are based on two 
consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, identified by Cross (1996). 
Source: Statistics Canada Cat.13-355 for the period 1946–86, and Cat. 13-001 for the period 1987–91.  22 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample of Canadian Manufacturing Firms 1992Q2–
1999Q4, Millions of 1992 Canadian dollars 
 
  Full 
sample 
Young  Old  Unrated  Bond 
rating 
Small  Large 
               
Total assets (TA)  1920.33  628.60  2948.68  458.39  4591.84  65.49  3142.05 
  (4224.31)  (1164.96)  (5347.39)  (1034.23)  (6122.34)  (61.90)  (5083.63) 
               
Inventory stock (N)  259.42  60.06  418.12  458.39  4591.84  65.49  3142.05 
  (621.26)  (108.97)  (791.93)  (1034.23)  (6122.34)  (61.90)  (5083.63) 
               
Sales (S)  389.18  117.06  605.82  123.30  875.05  18.49  633.35 
  (782.42)  (208.60)  (979.45)  (241.21)  (1122.57)  (20.91)  (930.15) 
               
Cash flow (CF)  35.35  11.15  54.61  10.37  80.99  1.07  57.92 
  (80.05)  (36.08)  (98.19)  (36.01)  (111.96)  (3.16)  (96.65) 
               
N/TA  0.165  0.156  0.173  0.179  0.140  0.195  0.146 
  (0.098)  (0.095)  (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.082)  (0.112)  (0.081) 
               
?N/TA  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.005  0.003 
  (0.029)  (0.035)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.017)  (0.040)  (0.018) 
               
S/N  2.150  2.248  2.072  2.108  2.227  1.856  2.343 
  (2.237)  (2.833)  (1.609)  (1.844)  (2.816)  (1.691)  (2.515) 
               
S/TA  0.255  0.241  0.266  0.282  0.206  0.268  0.247 
  (0.123)  (0.133)  (0.113)  (0.131)  (0.088)  (0.133)  (0.115) 
               
CF/TA  0.013  0.005  0.020  0.010  0.019  -0.001  0.022 
  (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.031)  (0.053)  (0.017)  (0.064)  (0.020) 
               
Number of obs.  2211  980  1231  1429  782  878  1333 
Number of firms  166  94  89  125  41  104  88 
Notes: Sample means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. The total number of firms and observations 
for the subsamples do not add to totals for the full sample, since a firm can shift categories. “Young” refers to 
observations where age is lower than the median age of firms in the sample at that time. “Unrated” contains 
observations on firms that did not have a bond rating as of the end of the sample period, and “Bond rating” refers to 
those that did. “Small” consists of observations on firms with total assets less than the median value in a given 
quarter, while the remaining observations make up “Large.” 23 
Table 3: Regression Results for Full Sample of Firms: Regressions Using All Cash Flow 
Observations versus Non-negative Cash Flow and Negative Cash Flow Observations 
 
  All cash flow 
observations , 
Non-negative cash flow 
observations only, 
Negative cash flow 
observations only, 
  full sample  full sample  full sample 
  166 firms  135 firms  30 firms 
  2211 obs.  1475 obs.  134 obs. 
?CFit- 1 / TA it-1  0.046  0.380***  -0.048 
  (0.069)  (0.141)  (0.057) 
?Sit-1 / Nit-1  0.008***  0.012***  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
?rt-1  -0.002  0.005  0.031*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
S??N i / TA i  -0.144*  -0.323***  -0.281* 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.150) 
S??Si / TAi  -0.032  -0.024  0.0722 
  (0.055)  (0.036)  (0.083) 
S??CFi / TAi  -0.087  -0.523***  0.060 
  (0.077)  (0.195)  (0.096) 
S??r   -0.001  -0.006  -0.018 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.008)** 
Sargan test  130.5  105.2  0.00 
  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
m2 test  0.80  1.45  -0.13 
  (0.42)  (0.15)  (0.90) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of inventory investment divided by total assets in period t, 
??Nit/TAit. S??X provides the sum of coefficients for two lags of the second difference of X. All equations are 
estimated with the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with ?Sit-1/Nit-1, ?rt-1, ?CFit-1/TAit-1, two lags of ??Sit/TAit, 
??CFit/TAit, ??r t, and ??N it-3/TAit-3, and further lags as instruments. Differenced time dummies are also included in 
the instrument set. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors and test statistics for coefficients are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. The significance of coefficients at various levels is indicated by *** for the 1 per cent 
level, ** for the 5 per cent level, and * for the 10 per cent level. Two-step results for the Sargan test and m2 test are 
reported with p-values in parentheses. One-step results are presented for coefficients and test statistics.   24 
Table 4: Regression Results with Sample Split by Age of Firms: Regressions Using All 
Cash Flow Observations versus Non-negative Cash Flow Observations Only (standard 
errors shown in parentheses) 
 
 
All cash flow observations 
Non-negative cash flow observations 
only 
  Young firms  Old firms  Young firms  Old firms 
  94 firms  89 firms  78 firms  72 firms 
  980 obs.  1231 obs.  621 obs.  854 obs. 
?CFit-1 / TAit-1  -0.060  0.248*  0.278*  0.585*** 
  (0.069)  (0.135)  (0.161)  (0.185) 
?S it-1 / Nit-1  0.006***  0.018***  0.008***  0.009*** 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
?r t-1  -0.006  0.001  -0.008**  -0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
S??N i / TAi  -0.204*  -0.136  -0.318***  -0.390*** 
  (0.108)  (0.102)  (0.105)  (0.096) 
S??Si / TAi  -0.055  -0.079  -0.042  -0.060 
  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.047)  (0.053) 
S??CF i / TA i  0.045  -0.190  -0.423  -0.467* 
  (0.072)  (0.154)  (0.271)  (0.257) 
S??r   0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Sargan test  58.91  54.44  41.90  35.63 
  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
m2 test  1.27  -1.11  0.69  -0.52 
  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.49)  (0.61) 
Note: See notes to Table 3.  25 
Table 5: Regression Results with Sample Split by Bond Rating: 
Regressions Using All Cash Flow Observations versus Non-negative Cash Flow 
Observations Only (standard errors shown in parentheses) 
 
 
All cash flow observations 
Non-negative cash flow observations 
only 
  Unrated firms  Rated firms  Unrated firms  Rated firms
a 
  125 firms  41 firms  94 firms  40 firms 
  1429 obs.  782 obs.  923 obs.  488 obs. 
?CFit-1 / TAit-1  0.055  0.267***  0.283*  0.273*** 
  (0.069)  (0.102)  (0.165)  (0.104) 
?S it-1 / Nit-1  0.008***  0.007**  0.012***  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
?r t-1  -0.004  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
S??N i / TAi  -0.169**  -0.229**  -0.358***  -0.411*** 
  (0.085)  (0.101)  (0.080)  (0.091) 
S??Si / TAi  -0.038  -0.093**  -0.022  0.012 
  (0.065)  (0.044)  (0.040)  (0.042) 
S??CF i / TA i  -0.081  -0.291***  -0.364  -0.048 
  (0.081)  (0.117)  (0.230)  (0.279) 
S??r   -0.003  0.002  0.001  0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Sargan test  89.70  5.34  63.77  1.81 
  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
m2 test  0.45  -0.88  1.06  -1.89 
  (0.66)  (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.06) 
a. The m2 test for the original regression equation shows that the residuals are AR (2). I correct for this by using the 
same long-run variables as the original instrument set, but using the earlier lags (t-2 and t-3) of the short-run 
variables for sales, cash flow, and interest rates as instruments. See notes to Table 3.   26 
Table 6: Regression Results with Sample Split by Size of Firm: 
Regressions Using All Cash Flow Observations versus Non-negative Cash Flow 
Observations Only (standard errors shown in parentheses) 
 
 
  All cash flow observations 
Non-negative cash flow observations 
only 
  Small firms  Large firms
a  Small firms  Large firms 
  104 firms  86 firms  77 firms  75 firms 
  878 obs.  1231 obs.  582 obs.  893 obs. 
?CFit-1 / TAit-1  0.021  0.046  0.365**  0.464*** 
  (0.077)  (0.032)  (0.161)  (0.144) 
?Sit-1 / Nit-1  0.010***  0.004**  0.008***  0.009*** 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
?r t-1  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
S??N i / TAi  -0.194*  -0.275***  -0.379***  -0.407*** 
  (0.103)  (0.069)  (0.095)  (0.112) 
S??Si / TAi  -0.052  0.008  -0.018  -0.079** 
  (0.077)  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.033) 
S??CF i / TA i  -0.048  0.000  -0.495**  -0.487** 
  (0.090)  (0.045)  (0.253)  (0.235) 
S??r   -0.008  0.000  -0.007  0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
Sargan test  64.57  52.02  42.54  39.76 
  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
m2 test  0.000  1.30  0.64  0.52 
  (1.00)  (0.20)  (0.53)  (0.60) 
a. The m2 test for the original regression shows that the residuals may be AR (2). I correct for this by using the same 
variables as the original regression, but each variable is lagged one further period. See notes to Table 3. 27 
 
Figure 1: The Effect of Cash Flow and Asymmetric Information on Investment 
in Povel and Raith’s Model 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
 
Variable  Description 
GDP deflator  Implicit price index, all items. Statistics Canada, Cansim series 
label D15612. 
 
Inventory stock (N)  Compustat data on total inventories. Defined as merchandise 
bought for resale and materials and supplies purchased for use in 
production of revenue, including work in progress. Total nominal 




Calculated from nominal Compustat data on total inventory stocks 
deflated using the GDP deflator. Defined as change in real 
inventory stocks Nit-Nit-1. 
 
Cash flow (CF)  Compustat data defined as income before extraordinary items 
(income after all expenses except dividends) plus depreciation and 
amortization charges. Nominal cash flow is converted to real using 
the GDP deflator. 
 
Sales (S)  Compustat data defined as sales net of cash discounts, trade 
discounts, returned sales, and allowances. Nominal sales converted 
to real terms using GDP deflator. 
 
Total assets (TA)  Current assets plus net property, plant, and equipment plus other 
non-current assets (including intangible assets, deferred items, 
investments, and advances). Nominal values converted to real 
terms using GDP deflator. 
 
Real interest rate (r)  Calculated as the prime lending rate less the inflation rate. The 
inflation rate  is calculated using the GDP deflator. Prime interest 
rate data are from the Bank of Canada. 
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